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THE EXPERT WITNESS
AND
THE PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
Otto C. Sommerich* and Benjamin Busch*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few lawyers, scholars or students, are exempt from the fascination
that comes from a glimpse into the legal systems of other nations
or communities, revealed by the reading of decisions dealing with that
subject. It is a truism that the history of a civilization is the history
of its laws.
A survey of legal decisions based on foreign law does not, however,
tell the whole story, for these decisions generally discuss the laws that
have already been pleaded and proved, without indicating the rocky
and treacherous course that the legal practitioners must have traveled
before these laws came within the technical cognizance of the court.
Today, more than at any other time in our legal history, it is neces-
sary for each practicing lawyer 'to have a full appreciation of the
technical aspects of foreign law in litigation. The problem is no
longer exclusively the field of a small segment of the Bar, but rather
the responsibility of every member of the profession. The recent war
and its consequent displacement of population, as well as the increased
reliance of all nations upon foreign trade, have brought to our midst
-persons of all degrees of wealth, with claims and disputes that have
originated from or are dependent for their solution upon the laws of
countries from almost every part of the globe.
Nor is it a subject that may be relegated to a period of hasty prep-
aration immediately prior to trial. The most disastrous consequences
await the individual attorney and his client when the problem of
proving foreign law has been ignored at the very start of the litigation.
Indeed, from the very first interview, the practitioner must at least
* Members of the New York Bar. See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 213, for
biographical data. This article is an expansion of an address delivered by Mr. Benjamin
Busch before the American Foreign Law Association on March 27, 1952.
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be aware that differences exist between civil law systems and our
common law; that the translation of a foreign language is not a mere
clerical detail; that differences in the nuances of language may
well make the difference in legal results; that even as the client speaks,
the decision to sue or not to sue must be thought of in terms of the
necessity and availability of statutes, commentaries, authorities, trans-
lators, and experts to support the necessary contentions.
The decision to sue is but the start of a building process. The legal
counsel prepares his material and builds the structure into the final
form of submission for the decision of the court. The process includes
reducing new concepts of law to statements of ultimate fact for the pur-
pose of pleading' and arraying them in greater detail for particulariza-
tion; collecting foreign documents and foreign legal literature and
obtaining authentications and certifications of them; supervising their
translations; interviewing foreign experts; studying their qualifications
and integrating their knowledge into common law forms and elements.
But the role of the attorney is more than that of a mere technician;
he is indeed an impresario upon whom falls the responsibility of pre-
paring the entire drama that will unfold at the trial or the submission
to the court. With the preparation for the presentation must come an
employment of the psychology of human nature, a sensitivity to the
existence of prejudice against foreign institutions, and an ability to
overcome it. The testimony of each witness must bespeak a preparation
that has eliminated every element which may erase welcome attention
by a court or jury.
The purpose of the discussion that follows, which must necessarily
be limited and generalized in view of the complexity of the problem,
is largely to promote an awareness and understanding of these problems.2
Foreign Law As An Evidentiary Fact in Common Law Jurisdictions
The ordinary principles of conflict of laws will largely determine
what rights of action and what defenses in a particular case should be
governed by foreign law.3 But once it has been decided exactly what
1 For an illustration of pleading foreign law, see note 48 infra.
2 See Russell, Book Review, 46 Amr. j'. INT'I L. 760 (1952), where the author, reviewing
Comparative Law Cases and Materials by Professor Rudolf B. Schlesinger, refers to
the "'bread-and-butter' problem of how to prove foreign law in our courts."
3 The problem of proving foreign law, of course, did not arise until it was established
that the courts of a particular forum could determine rights and liabilities that did
not originate from the laws of the forum. The development of the conflict of laws in
England is, historically speaking, quite recent, and for a long period of time it was an
incontrovertible maxim that every action tried by an English court must be tried by
the law of England. See Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law in 3
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elements of foreign law are to be introduced into the case and as those
rules are being analyzed, the question arises of how they are to be
introduced. In preparing the pleadings and in marshalling the evidence,
what procedural techniques are to be understood? In short, how is
the foreign law to be applied?
The attitude of courts and legislatures toward the procedural prob-
lems involved in giving effect to foreign law has had a long and perhaps
difficult history. The prevailing idea under the common law in England
and in the United States has been that foreign law is a fact and must
be proved as a fact; courts will not take judicial notice of foreign laws.
The exact origin of this view is somewhat obscure. One rather
formalistic rationale that has been suggested is that since the only
"law" applied by a court is domestic law, every other element in the
case must, in the nature of things, be a fact.4 Foreign law, therefore,
more or less by definition being thrust into the category of facts, must
be proved as facts are proved. Generally, however, the fact theory
is explained on the ground that although the court can reasonably be
expected to know the law of its own forum, it is unreasonable and
impractical to presume its knowledge of the laws of other jurisdictions
and that ". . the foreign law and its application, like any other results
of knowledge and experience in matters of which no knowledge is
imputed to the Judge, must be proved as facts are proved, by ap-
propriate evidence . . ";-5 hence the rule that foreign law must be
proved as a fact:
With foreign laws an English Judge cannot be familiar; there are many
of which he must be totally ignorant: there is, in every case of foreign
law, an absence of all the accumulated knowledge and ready associations
which assist him in the consideration of that which is the English law,
and of the manner in which it ought to be applied, in a given state of
circumstances to which it is applicable. He is not only without the
usual and necessary assistance afforded by the accumulated knowledge
and suggestions contained in the arguments which are addressed to
him, but he is constantly liable to be misled by the erroneous suggestion
of analogies which arise in his own mind, and are pressed upon him from
all sides."
LAw: A CENTURY OF PRooaSs 342 (1937). The modem legal theory was first formulated
by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775):
Every action tried here must be tried by the law of England; but the law of England
says, that in a variety of circumstances, with regard to contracts legally made abroad,
the laws of the country where the cause of action arose shall govern.
Id. at 344, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1121. See also Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hag. Con. 393, 161
Eng. Rep. 782 (1752).
4 3 BEALIE, Co-xmcT or LAWS § 621.1 (1935).
6 Nelson v. Bridport, 8 Beav. 527, 536, 50 Eng. Rep. 207, 211 (1845).
6 Id. at 534, 50 Eng. Rep. at 210.
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This common law approach of treating foreign law as a fact to be
proved like any other fact did not, however, receive universal recogni-
tion. Legal scholars of central Europe found the fact theory, with its
rather sceptical attitude toward the dignity of foreign law, poorly
adapted to their conception of the principles of conflict of laws. Savigny
in the nineteenth century had urged that the recognition of foreign
legal systems necessarily followed from the equality between nationals
and foreigners demanded by the law of nations. Under this impetus,
knowledge of the foreign law was imposed as a duty upon the court,
regardless of what was pleaded or proved by the parties concerning
the foreign laws. The maxim was that the court knows the lawl "Jura
novit curia". The jurisprudence of Germany, Holland, Italy, and other
European nations bears the imprint of this tradition.7
It is the procedural rules and techniques that have developed from
the application in practice of these two ideas that are of primary interest
in planning and preparing a case dealing with foreign law; it is not
the intention here to dwell on purely theoretical or historical origins.
Nevertheless, it is interesting and perhaps helpful to keep in mind the
background and theoretical source of the procedural principles in tracing
the development of the mechanics of proving foreign law: much of
the current practice is a composite that borrows features from each
school. However sharply contrasting and inconsistent the fact theory
and juridical notice appear in their theoretical formulation, experience
in handling foreign law problems has revealed deficiencies in one
system which could be remedied by adopting some of the methods of
the other.
The emphasis in England concerning the proof of foreign law has
been on the oral testimony of witnesses qualified to speak as experts
upon the law in question. It was apparently thought at one time that
the proper method of proving foreign written law was by producing
a copy of it properly authenticated.' The Sussex Peerage9 case, how-
ever, from which the prevailing common law technique for proving
foreign law in England originated, established in 1844 that the foreign
law should be proved by the testimony of an expert witness and not
by producing merely a copy of a statute or legislative text:'"
7 Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1019 (1941).
8 See the Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844) ; 2 TAYLOR, EVIDENCE
905 (12th ed., Croom-Johnson and Bridgman, 1931); PMPSON, EVIDENCE 405 (9th ed 1952).
9 The Sussex Peerage, note 8 supra.
10 7 WIGmopF, EVIDENCE § 2090-a (3d ed. 1940); citing also 2 TAYLOR, EvIDENCE
§ 1525 (12th ed. Croom-Johnson and Bridgman, 1931). In addition, see to the same
effect: Lozard Bros. & Co. v. Midland Bank, [1933] A.C. 289; Beatty v. Beatty, [1924]
1 K.B. 807, 814; Nelson v. Bridport, 8 Beav. 527, 50 Eng. Rep. 207 (1845).
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The witness may refer to the sources of his knowledge; but it is per-
fectly clear that the proper mode of proving foreign law is not by show-
ing to the House the book of the law; for the House has not organs to
know and to deal with the text of that law, and therefore requires the
assistance of a lawyer who knows how to interpret it."
In the United States, with modifications in details, the courts adopted
the fact theory established in England: foreign law must be pleaded
and proved by the party who has the affirmative of the issues on the
merits. In Monroe v. Douglass,'" for example, the New York Court
of Appeals stated:
The courts of a country are presumed to be acquainted only with their
own laws; those of other countries are to be averred and proved, like
other facts of which courts do not take judicial notice; and the mode
of proving them, whether they be written or unwritten, has long been
established. 13
In its broadest aspects, the method of proving foreign law in this
country is described by the statement that, "The proof of the law of
a foreign country may be by the introduction in evidence of its statutes
and judicial decisions, or by the testimony of experts learned in the
law, or by both."' 4 A more detailed explanation, however, is obviously
needed for a working knowledge of the actual techniques available.
The law of New York has developed along the following lines.'
Where the case turned on foreign written law--statutes, codes,
proclamations or decrees, and the like-that law was to be proved
in the first instance by copies of the statutes or decrees themselves;
oral testimony alone of the foreign written law was insufficient.'8
According to the common law rules, a copy of the foreign statute was
required to be authenticated by exemplification, the testimony of a
witness who had examined the original, or by the certification of a
judicial officer of the foreign jurisdiction.' As a result of successive
11 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 115, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1046 (1844).
12 5 N.Y. 447 (1851).
13 Id. at 451.
14 Electric Welding Co. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386, 390, 86 N.E. 947, 948 (1909).
15 See for a thorough exposition of the proof of foreign law in New York, 9 N.Y.
Jumm. Coumc.m REP'. 267, 271-85 (1943).
16 Russian Re-Insurance Co. v. Stoddard, 211 App. Div. 132, 207 N.Y. Supp. 574 (3d
Dep't 1925) rev'd on other grounds, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925), reargumnent denied,
240 N.Y. 682, 148 N.E. 757 (1925); Pirrung v. Supreme Council, 104 App. Div. 571, 93 N.Y.
Supp. 575 (4th Dep't i905) (foreign country); Taylor v. Chamberlain, 6 App. Div. 38, 39
N.Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dep't 1896); Toulandou v. Lachenmeyer, 6 Abb. N.S. 215, 37 How.
Prac. 145 (1869) (sister state).
17 Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 475 (N.Y. 1831); Packard v. Hill, 2 Wend. 411 (N.Y.
1829); STORy, CoN'mLcr OF LAWS § 641 (3d ed. 1876).
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statutory modifications, the requirement of authentication has been
discarded, and copies of the statutes or ordinances that can be proved
to have been issued by the authority of the other state or foreign
country or proved to be recognized as evidence of the existing law in
its courts are admissible.' 8 In the language of the statute, "A printed
copy of the statute, or other written law . . . or a printed copy of a
proclamation, edict, decree or ordinance . . ." are admissible and are
presumptive evidence of the law contained in them.1" If it should
happen, however, that the statutes or decrees cannot be proved to be
official publications or commonly admitted as evidence in the foreign
jurisdiction, the copies must be certified or authenticated in the manner
prescribed by statute before they are acceptable evidence.
One of the important things to bear in mind under the rules govern-
ing the formal proof of foreign law in New York is the relation between
the admissibility of documentary evidence and oral testimony. Although
oral testimony cannot be substituted for the proof of foreign written law
required by the statute, 0 it is clear that the testimony of expert
witnesses can accompany the written proof as evidence to support
the particular interpretation urged by the party;2' indeed, where the
proof of the law of a foreign country rather than of a sister state is in-
volved, it is possible that the New York courts may require the testimony
of experts.22 In only one, perhaps relatively rare situation, is this
proposition doubtful: where the law is found in a single statute or
decision and the only question concerns its contents. The New York
Supreme Court in dealing with this question in applying a statute of
Quebec spoke in the following language:
[W]here the evidence of foreign law consists entirely of a written docu-
ment, statute or judicial opinion, the question of its construction and effect
is for the court alone, and evidence of a lawyer of another State or
country, as to what in the opinion of lawyers there, should be the con-
struction of a statute of that State or country is not admissible where
the language of the statute is plain, and there is no decision by the
courts of that State or country upon the point in controversy.2
It is to be questioned whether courts would or should go so far today.
Where the "unwritten" law of a foreign jurisdiction-its common
law contained in its decisions, and its customs and usages-is in issue,
18 N.Y. Laws 1848, c. 312; N.Y. Laws 1920, c. 925; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 391.
19 N.Y. Civ. PrAc. AcT § 391.
20 See note 16 supra.
21 See Matter of Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439 (3d Dep't
1931).
22 See Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 1018, 1026.
2 Molson's Bank v. Boardman, 47 Hun 135, 142 (N.Y. 1888); see also note 102 infra.
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it may be proved either by the testimony of experts or by documentary
evidence. The statute provides that in the latter instance, books of
reports of cases must be admitted as presumptive evidence of the
unwritten or common law.24
In short, the rule remained uniform in New York that foreign law
was a fact to be pleaded and proved by the party who relied on it.
And the application of foreign law by the court where it was not
formally introduced by the proper party was error. 6
Despite the persuasiveness of the explanations in favor of the fact
theory, the idea in practice tended to develop some rather oppressive
requirements that in many cases fell short of assisting in the efficient
and fair trial of the action. The materials and testimony used in
proving the foreign law were, for example, subject to the objections
of incompetency or hearsay and the other formal evidentiary rules
of exclusion that applied to the proof of ordinary facts. Often it was
needlessly time consuming and expensive to prepare evidence to with-
stand these tecinical objections when there could be no genuine dispute
about the authority of the proffered records. Furthermore, the as-
similation of foreign law to the status of a fact involved the courts in
logical exercises that invited conclusions which could not be sustained
by either reason or justice. The foremost of these was the question
whether, for the purposes of appellate review for example, a question
of foreign law was a question of law or fact. In New York there were
cases that supported either answer,27 and the question was not finally
24 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 391.
2- Croker v. Croker, 252 N.Y. 24, 168 N.E. 450 (1929); Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., 245
N.Y. 152, 156 N.E. 647 (1927); Hanna v. Lichtenhein, 225 N.Y. 579, 122 N.E. 625 (1919)
Hifler v. Calmac Oil & Gas Corp., 10 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1939).
26 Phillips v. Griffin, 236 App. Div. 209, 210, 259 N.Y. Supp. 105, 106 (3d Dep't 1932);
Schweitzer v. Hamburg-Amerikanische P.A.G., 149 App. Div. 900, 904, 134 N.Y. Supp.
812, 815 (2d Dep't 1912).
27 Bank of China v. Morse, 168 N.Y. 458, 61 N.E. 774 (1901); Fitzpatrick v. Int'l Ry.,
252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112, 68 A.L.R. 801 (1929) (question of law); contra, Read v.
Lehigh Valley R.R., 284 N.Y. 435, 31 N.E.2d 891 (1941); Los Angeles Investment Securities
Corp. v. Joslyn, 158 Misc. 164, 284 N.Y. Supp. 36 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1939), aff'd,
254 App. Div. 711, 4 N.Y.S.2d 140 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd without opinion, 279 N.Y. 734,
18 N.E.2d 684 (1939), rehearing denied, 280 N.Y. 570, 20 N.E.2d 19 (1935), new trial
granted, 12 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1938), rev'd, 258 App. Div. 762,
14 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1939), motion to resettle decision denied, 258 App. Div. 821, 15
N.Y.S.2d 175 (1939), motion granted, 258 App. Div. 1018, 15 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1939),
appeal granted, 282 N.Y. 592, 25 N.E.2d 146 (1940), appeal dismissed, 282 N.Y. 438, 26
N.E.2d 968 (1940).
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settled until the passage of a statute in 1943 providing that the issue
was clearly one of law.2"
The Growth of Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
The influence of Savigny had undoubtedly left its mark on scholars
both in England and the United States. Professor Thayer, in his
Treatise on Evidence,29 strongly advocated that judicial notice be
taken of foreign law. Both this influence from the commentators and
an increasing awareness of the inconvenience of adducing proof of
foreign law under the common law and formal statutory requirements
brought about a distinct trend advocating legislative action to insure
judicial notice.
In Massachusetts, a statute was enacted in 192680 requiring courts
to notice judicially the laws of foreign countries. A uniform act was
proposed, which was later adopted by many of the states under the
title, Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. This act, however,
provided for judicial notice of only the laws of sister states 1
The first evidence of a shift of attitude in New York came in 193332
with an amendment to Section 391 of the Civil Practice Act providing
that foreign law was to be determined by the court and charged to
the jury, if there was one, and that in determining the foreign law,
. . . neither the trial court nor any appellate court shall be limited to
the evidence produced on the trial by the parties, but may consult any
of the written authorities above named in this section, with the same
force and effect as if the same had been admitted in evidence.
The wording of the amendment implied, and interpretation by the
courts confirmed, that the judicial notice then allowed by the statute
could only supplement evidence of the foreign law introduced in the
orthodox way by the parties.3  If there was an omission to produce any
evidence at all, it remained, as before the amendment, error for the
28 N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. AcT § 344-a(B):
Whether a matter of law is judicially noticed pursuant to this section, or formal
proof thereof is taken pursuant to other sections of this act, such law shall be determined
by the court or referee and included in its findings, or charged to the jury as the case
may be. Such finding or charge shall be subject to review on appeal and shall be
known and otherwise treated as a finding or charge on a matter of law.
29 THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EviDncE, 257 (1898).
30 Mass. Stat. 1926, c. 168, MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 233, § 70 (1932).
31 UNIFORM JumIcL NoNcE OF FOREiGN LAW AcT § 1, 9 U.L.A. 401 (1951).
32 The trend in New York resulted entirely from statutory changes; there were no
judicial attempts to revise the prior law. In 1930, then Chief Judge Cardozo stated in
Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. Nat. City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 34, 170 N.E. 479, 483 (1930):
"True, of course, it is that there is no judicial notice of the law of foreign lands."
33 Cherwien v. Geiter, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 185 (1936).
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court to apply the foreign law. The path of reform therefore was not
yet completed, and under the prodding of writers who pointed out the
still existing difficulties preventing a complete and flexible system of
judicial notice, 4 amendments were still suggested.
In 1943, the Judicial Council of New York in its Ninth Annual
Report, recommended a comprehensive new section of the Civil Practice
Act, explaining:
The proposed new section would eliminate the necessity of introducing
in evidence a copy of a decision of statute of a sister state or a foreign
country as a condition precedent to the court's taking judicial notice of
its law.35
As a result of the Judicial Council's Recommendation, Section 344-a
of the Civil Practice Act was enacted in 1943, providing in part as
follows:
Sec. 344-a. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MATTERS OF LAW.
A. Except as otherwise expressly required by law, any trial or appellate
court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice of the following matters
of law:
1. A law, statute, proclamation, edict, decree, ordinance, or the un-
written or common law of a sister state, a territory or other
jurisdiction of the United States, or a foreign country or political
subdivision thereof.
C. Where a matter of law specified in this section is judicially
noticed, the court may consider any testimony, document, information
or argument on the subject, whether the same is offered by counsel, a
third party or discovered through its own research.
D. The failure of either party to plead any matter of law specified
in this section shall not be held to preclude either the trial or appellate
court from taking judicial notice thereof.
In 1944, the question still remained open whether Section 344-a
could be applied in cases triable as of right by jury.86 This question
was settled in 1947, however, when the constitutionality of the foregoing
provisions was upheld in Matter of Jongebloed v. Erie R.R.3 7
Pleading and Proving Foreign Law Still Necessary
In the face of the broad provisions contained in Section 344-a of the
Civil Practice Act, permitting courts to take judicial notice of foreign
law, the Bar of New York could properly ask itself whether it was
34 Wachtell, Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. REv. 526 (1935).
35 9 N.Y. JuDicum. CouNci. REP. 267, 279 (1943).
36 Graybar Elec. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 292 N.Y. 246, 250, 54 N.E.2d
811, 813 (1944).
37 297 N.Y. 534, 74 N.E.2d 470 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 855 (1948).
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necessary to plead foreign law at all or even to prove it. Was it not
now the function of the court to act as Savigny and the international
school had prescribed and to determine the law for itself without
the assistance of the parties? Now, almost ten years after the effective
date of the statute (September 1, 1943) although many of these
questions presented by the statute are still in dispute, the trends are
noticeable and offer definite guide posts.
As far as pleading is concerned, it followed quite logically that ad-
herence to the fact theory, requiring foreign law to be introduced
into the case by the same technique as were ordinary facts, required
that the law be pleaded as an ultimate fact. Beyond being logical,
however, this result had a good deal to recommend it in the way of
fairness and decency: where the right of action was based on strange
and unfamiliar law, the requirement of pleading that law gave the
adverse party an indication of how to approach the preparation of
his case. Although under the language of Section 344-a it may not
have appeared as self-evident as before that foreign law should be
pleaded, the practical reason for requiring pleading still retained con-
siderable validity. It could not be realistically argued that permissive
authority for the court to judicially notice foreign law-either by
accepting information from the parties or by engaging in its own
research---converted foreign law into a matter of such common knowledge
that pleading it would in all cases be superfluous.
Until May 29, 1952, the lower courts were fairly well agreed that
the pre-existing law, which had required that the foreign law upon
which a party relied should be pleaded, 8 still continued and had not
been changed by Section 344-a,39 at least where the law involved was
the statute of a foreign country having an unfamiliar jurisprudence.
On May 29, 1952, however, the New York Court of Appeals an-
nounced its decision in Pfleuger v. Pfleuger,40 a case that should cause
considerable discussion on the subject of pleading foreign law.
38 Croker v. Croker, 252 N.Y. 24, 168 N.E. 450 (1929).
39 Bergman v. Lax, 107 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sip. Ct. N.Y. County 1951); Schumann v.
Loew's Inc., 199 Misc. 38, 102 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951). But see,
Chesny v. Chesny, 278 App. Div. 586, 102 N.Y.S.2d 227 (2d Dep't 1951); contra, Raphael
v. Raphael, 189 Misc. 144, 71 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947); Silberfeld v.
Swiss Bank Corp., 183 Misc. 234, 50 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1944), aff'd,
268 App. Div. 984 (1st Dep't 1944) (the pleadings alleged facts which the court held
created an obligation under the law of any civilized country). See also, Sommerich, Report
of the Committee on Foreign Law, 2 N.Y. CiTy BAR Assr REcoRD 128 (1947); Editorial,
Pleading, Proof, and Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 117 N.Y.LJ. 1560, col. I (Apr.
22, 1947).
40 304 N.Y. 148, 106 N.E.2d 495 (1952).
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The action in the Pfleuger case was one to recover for the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's intestate, which had been caused by an auto-
mobile accident in the state of Pennsylvania. The complaint, however,
did not specify the Pennsylvania statute upon which plaintiff based
her cause of action. Defendant, contending that failure to allege the
Pennsylvania statute was a fatal defect, moved at Special Term to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The motion failed at Special Term, but the Ap-
pellate Division reversed and ordered the complaint dismissed,41 with
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.4 2 The Appellate Division
in its decision stressed that Subdivision D of Section 344-a, in allowing
a court to take judicial notice notwithstanding the failure of a party
to plead foreign law, applied only to either the trial or appellate court,
and not to a Special Term.43 In other words, where an objection is
raised before trial to the omission to plead foreign law, the defect cannot
be cured by judicial notice.
The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that such a
narrow interpretation would thwart the purpose of Section 344-a and
that "trial court" referred to the court of original jurisdiction, including
its Special Term for Motions as well as its trial term, as distinguished
from appellate courts.
The Court further pointed out that Section 344-a is permissive and
not mandatory, but that since the law upon which the plaintiff relied
was the statute of a sister state, the discretion of the court should
have been exercised to take judicial notice of it:
Obviously the statute which we are considering is permissive, not manda-
tory. Under its provisions judicial notice of the matters of foreign law
specified therein may be taken by a court "in its discretion". In the
exercise of such discretion the court may-in passing on the sufficiency
of a pleading-take, or refuse to take, judicial notice of the specified
matters of foreign law depending upon the deterrent factors of time,
cost, and other adverse considerations which may be involved in making
available to the court accurate knowledge of such foreign law. No such
difficulties should be encountered in the present case, where the law
upon which the plaintiff relies is a statute of the State of Pennsylvania.44
(Emphasis added.)
In answer to the argument on appeal that a defendant should be in-
41 278 App. Div. 247, 105 N.Y.S.2d 427 (4th Dep't 1951).
42 278 App. Div. 1022, 105 N.Y.S.2d 988 (4th Dep't 1951).
43 Subdivision D reads as follows:
The failure of either party to plead any matter of law specified in this section
shall not be held to preclude either the trial or appellate court from taking judicial
notice thereof.
44 304 N.Y. 148, 152, 106 N.E.2d 495, 496 (1952).
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formed .of the statutes upon which the plaintiff relies, the court pointed
out that the defendants could have reached their objective by a correc-
tive motion to make the pleading more definite and certain,4' or by
a motion for a bill of particulars.46
The exact holding of the Pfleuger case is that the Supreme Court at
its Special Term for Motions is empowered to take judicial notice of
foreign law to sustain a pleading, and that under the particular facts
it was a proper exercise of discretion to notice the statute of a sister
state. Although the decision is clear on the question of the power
of the court to take judicial notice in such a situation, it does not say
that the power, clearly a discretionary one, must be exercised in every
case. In some cases, a motion could properly be brought to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action a complaint that omits to allege the per-
tinent foreign law. While no arbitrary rule should be laid to the Court of
Appeals, it would seem proper that in cases arising upon motions addressed
to the pleadings, a court, in the exercise of its discretion, should refuse
to take judicial notice of a statute relied upon by a party who has failed
to plead it in his complaint where the foreign law in question is one that
has been enacted in a language other than English and cannot be
readily located in the law libraries available to the average practitioner.
The reference by the Court of Appeals in the Pfleuger case to Wig-
more's statement 47 that the technical insistence on treating the States
of the Union as foreign to each other is absurd, lends credence to the
belief that the decision of the court is limited to instances involving
the laws of a sister state.
It is clear that a litigant who is served with a pleading setting
forth the substance and effect of foreign laws relied upon is entitled
to something more in order to prepare for the trial of the action.4 8
45 N.Y.R. CIv. PRAc. 102(1).
46 The Court of Appeals cited the cases collected in Busch, Bills of Partidars oj
Foreign Law, 125 N.Y.LJ. 836, col. 1 (Mar. 8, 1951), as its authority on this subject.
47 WIGORi, EvmENcE § 2573 (3d ed. 1940).
48 The general rule regarding particularity in the pleading of foreign law is that the
substance of the laws relied upon must be set forth in a manner that enables the court
to determine the meaning and effect thereof. See for example, Grossman v. Western Finan-
cial Corp., 280 App. Div. 833, 114 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1952). The allegation there
approved read as follows:
That, under the provision of Military Government Law No. 56, enacted in 1947 by
the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) for the United States area of
control, and of Order No. 78, enacted in 1947 by the Control Commission for Gern.any
(British Element) for the United Kingdom area of control, and effective at all
times mentioned in the complaint herein, it was and is illegal to enter into contracts
or engage in practices which promote or continue acts or entities in Western Germany
which operate to or tend to restrain trade or commerce.
The need for a bill of particulars would be self-evident if the allegation had read:
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The statement of the Court of Appeals to that effect in Pfleuger v.
Pfeuge 9 has come after a series of conflicting decisions on the subject.60
Decisions prior to Section 344-a held that a bill of particulars should
be furnished of the foreign laws relied upon5 ' and in some cases re-
quired that there should be stated the title, section, and paragraph
numbers of the statutes, and the volume, gazette or pamphlet from
which they were compiled or in which they were contained." On one
occasion the Appellate Division required a party to furnish particulars
of decisional law, as distinguished from statutes.55
After the effective date of Section 344-a, a question was raised in
one case whether it was proper to require a bill of particulars concern-
ing foreign law, since under the statute,"' the court would not be
limited by the bill, but could consider any testimony, document, in-
formation or argument on the subject of the foreign law, whether
offered by counsel, a third party, or discovered through independent
research.55 Although in this case the court accepted this argument
and disapproved the demand for the bill, this limitation has not been
followed, and it has been suggested that the statement was dictum.'6
Under the law of the (mythical) Kingdom of Utopiana, effective at all times mentioned
in the complaint herein, it was and is illegal to enter into contracts or engage in practices
which operate or tend to restrain trade or commerce.
Such an allegation alleges the effect of foreign law as an ultimate fact and would seem
to be sufficient for a pleading. Chesny v. Chesny, 275 App. Div. 945, 89 N.Y.S.2d 604
(2d Dep't 1949); Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 162 App. Div. 613, 147 N.Y. Supp.
978 (1914), aff'd, 213 N.Y. 429, 108 N.E. 72 (1915); Rothschild v. Rio Grande Western
R.R., 26 Abb. N.C. 312, 13 N.Y. Supp. 361 (1st Dep't 1891); Throop v. Hatch, 3 Abb.
Pr. 23 (N.Y. 1856).
It must be borne in mind that in pleading foreign law, as with any other fact, the
ultimate fact, and not the evidence, must be alleged. de Cordova v. Sanville, 214 N.Y. 662,
108 N.E. 1092 (1915); decided on the dissenting opinion in 165 App. Div. 128, 150 N.Y.
Supp. 709 (1st Dep't 1914); accord, Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, supra. In Meijer v.
Gen. Cigar Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947), modified, 273 App. Div.
760, 75 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1st Dep't 1947), it was held that the allegation of a specific
foreign decree was evidentiary and should be stricken.
49 See note 46 supra.
50 See Busch, Bills of Particulars of Foreign Law, 125 N.Y.LJ. 836, col. 1 (Mar. 8,
1951); also referred to by the court in Estate of Hatchwell, 127 N.Y.L.J. 1164, col. 4'
(Surr. Ct. Mar. 24, 1952).
61 Haik v. Nebenzahl, 102 N.Y.LJ. 2336, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 1939); Georgas v.
Nat. Bank of Greece, 100 N.Y.JU. 2049, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 1938).
52 Nachmann v. Bergdoll, 102 N.Y.L.J. 1732, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 1939).
53 Leonor v. Ingenio Porvenir C. Por A., 262 App. Div. 992 (1st Dep't 1941). See also
De Gorter v. Banque de France, 109 N.Y.L.J. 157, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1943).
54 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 344-a(C).
55 Kraus v. Kraus, 183 Misc. 667, 51 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944).
66 Duboisky v. Duboisky, 118 N.YJ.J. 1721, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1947). See also
Souers v. Flota Aerea, etc., 121 N.Y.L.J. 229, col. 4 (City Ct. Jan. 19, 1949).
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Generally speaking, it seems well settled that an adverse party,
despite the possible effect of judicial notice, is entitled to a bill of
particulars. The bill may be granted, however, subject to the proviso
that furnishing particular items concerning the foreign law will not
limit the party supplying the particulars from establishing other and
further provisions of foreign law.57 And, the court while allowing
particulars on foreign statutory law, may deny them in regard to de-
cisional law.P8
In the Federal courts where judicial notice is not taken for pleading
purposes,59 particulars of applicable statutes as well as of decisional
law have been required.60
Presumptions Concerning Foreign Law
The power to notice judicially is unrestricted under the statute,
but whether the court will exercise its broad authority to notice foreign
law is clearly within its discretion. The Judicial Council, in its report
recommending Section 344-a, emphasized that the statute was not
intended to dispense with the need for proof,61 and the courts have,
generally speaking, exhibited a considerable degree of caution in de-
termining the proper circumstances for the judicial notice of matters
of foreign law. There has been, for example, the feeling that it would
be basically inconsistent with our notions of a fair trial to interpret
the statute as a mandate to the court to substitute its own researches on
questions of foreign law for those of the parties and to intervene upon
any occasion to supply proof of the law by judicial notice. There is
some support for the proposition that Section 344-a should properly be
used only to supplement evidence of the foreign law introduced by
the parties themselves. Arams v. Arams, 2 one of the first cases in-
terpreting the new statute, imported into its construction of Section
344-a the rule of former Section 391, that evidence of the law intro-
duced by the parties is a condition precedent to the availability of
judicial notice, and that the amendment becomes operative only when
foreign law has been invoked by one of the parties and after an op-
portunity has been given to both parties to litigate the question of what
the foreign law is:
57 Cappel v. Vassen, 114 N.Y.L.J. 3, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. July 2, 1945).
58 Von Hofmannsthal v. Wolfe, 277 App. Div. 858, 98 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1st Dep't 1950)
59 Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1944).
60 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche, 11 F.R.D. 48, 49 (1951).
61 9 N.Y. JunrciAL Coumcii REP. 267, 272 (1943).
62 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
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Substantially, therefore, wherever, before the new section, a party was under
the necessity of pleading and proving foreign law that same party now
is under a like necessity, subject only to the qualification that the con-
sequences of partial failure to prove such law may be mitigated, in the
discretion of the court, by the court's supplementing the proof by its
own researches.63
(It would seem that this proposition, although phrased in absolute
terms, can best be given effect by interpreting it as a principle of dis-
cretion rather than as a rule of law. Taken as a limitation on the power
to judicially notice, it seems contrary to the wording of Section 344-a.)
Similarly, in Matter of Mason,64 where the defendant, contending
that the contract on which the plaintiff based his claim was invalid
under the law of Italy, asked that judicial notice be taken "of such
Italian law as may be applicable," the court replied:
Under Section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act, the court in its discretion
may take judicial notice of foreign law but there seems to be no occasion
for independent research by the court when the parties themselves do not
indicate in any manner the law upon which they rely. The Italian re-
strictions, if any apply to this transaction, are disregarded because not
shown.65
A further consideration is, of course, the convenience with which
the court may acquaint itself with the foreign law and the probability
that it may make an accurate determination of it without argument.
Although the foregoing opinions indicate that the court may be more
favorably inclined to take judicial notice of certain matters of foreign
law when the parties have introduced their own proof, the question
whether the court will judicially notice or not is still completely dis-
cretionary. It seems clear that in many cases there will be a justifiable
feeling by the court that an adequate and fair decision on the issue
of the foreign law can be had only by requiring the parties to sustain
their burden of proving the foreign law as part of their case. Especially
63 Id. at 331, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
64 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
65 Id. at 310, 86 N.Y.S.2d at 234. The danger of relying upon judicial notice without
supplying satisfactory proof of the foreign law can also be gleaned from the cryptic
statement made by the court in Pacios v. Frank & Moloney, Inc., 109 N.Y.S.2d 805
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1057, 113 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1st Dep't 1952):
"The proof with respect to the Argentine law was skimpy and the court is in doubt as
to what it is." 109 N.Y.S.2d at 808. See also Valentine v. Valentine, 109 N.Y.S.2d
466 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 280 App. Div. 795, 112
N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't 1952); Estate of Feiner, 122 N.Y.L.J. 1746, col. 1 (Surr. Ct. N.Y.
County Dec. 22, 1949); Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 122 N.Y.L.J. 1212, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Nov.
14, 1949); Cf. Eisler v. Soskin, 272 App. Div. 894, 71 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd
mer., 297 N.Y. 841 (1948).
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is this so where the principles involved are derived from the unfamiliar
jurisprudence of a civil law country. In Berg v. Oriental Consolidated
Mining Co.,6 for example, the plaintiff claimed ownership under a
Swiss contract, and therefore was required to show that he had acquired
title under Swiss law. The court, in determining the question, observed
that the plaintiff's proof was incomplete and fell short of establishing
his ownership, and refusing to take judicial notice of any further
Swiss law, dismissed the complaint.
Assuming then that foreign law is relevant, but that the court has
refused to take judicial notice of the foreign law and has required proof,
what are the consequences of the parties' failure to adduce proof?
In the first instance, of course, the court may dismiss the case
simply for the reason that the party relying on foreign law, not having
introduced any proof of the law, has failed to make out his case.67
The courts, however, have recognized the often harsh results that'
follow from a dismissal and have attempted to mitigate the burden
of proving foreign law by the use of various devices, all of which have
the one feature in common of substituting, with varying degrees of
conclusiveness, the law of the forum for the foreign law.
It is frequently stated that presumptions should be indulged in by
the court where no evidence has been adduced regarding the laws of a
foreign jurisdiction. Where, for example, the legal systems of the
forum and the foreign jurisdiction have both originated from the
common law, the court may presfime that the foreign jurisdiction still
adheres to the common law and that it is the same as the common
law of the forum.68 The effect of this presumption is to relieve the
party having the affirmative of the issues on the merits from pleading
and proving the foreign law as a fact in order to establish a prima
facie case: through the aid of the presumption the foreign law is intro-
duced into the case by the plaintiff's showing what the domestic law
is. As a result, an immediate dismissal of the suit is avoided. Although
this is ordinarily a desirable outcome, it should be apparent that this
presumption of similarity is often less satisfactory than actual proof
of the foreign law and that as a matter of safest approach, every
66 70 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
67 Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
68 Read v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 284 N.Y. 435, 31 N.E. 891 (1940); Cherwien v. Geiter
272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 185 (1936); International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N.Y.
188, 99 N.E. 722 (1912); Crashley v. Press Pub. Co., 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904);
Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Co., 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't 1942);
Smith v. Compania Litografica, 127 Misc. 508, 217 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1926), aff'd, 220 App.
Div. 782 (2d Dep't 1926).
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effort should be made from the beginning to prove foreign law and
not to rely on presumptions. The presumption, in the first place, deals
only with the common law, and generally takes no account of statutory
changes that may have occurred in the forum or in the foreign jurisdic-
tion.69 Furthermore, it may only postpone the time when the plaintiff
will be required to introduce proof of the foreign law or lose his case. The
presumption aids the plaintiff in establishing only a prima facie case,
and the defendant is free to show that the foreign law is different from
that of the forum."0 If he succeeds in rebutting the presumption, there-
fore, the plaintiff will be compelled to prove that he is entitled to re-
cover under the foreign law or fail.
The presumption of similarity furthermore does not commonly exist
with respect to states or countries that administer the civil law;' if in
such a case the party relying on the foreign law fails to prove it, and the
court does not take judicial notice, the case must be dismissed. Cuba
Railroad v. Crosby" is a frequently cited authority for this proposition.
In the Crosby case, an employee had sued his employer to recover
for injuries sustained as a result of an accident that took place in
Cuba. No evidence was given at the trial regarding the Cuban law,
but the jury was charged on the law of the forum, the trial judge
stating that if the Cuban law was different from the lex Jori, it was for
the defendant to allege and prove it.
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court reversed
the judgment recovered by the plaintiff, holding in effect that the Federal
Courts cannot assume, without proof, that the law of Cuba is the same
as the law of the forum. The opinion states that the law of Cuba was
based upon the law of Spain, and that there is no general presumption
that that law is the same as the common law.
Mr. Justice Holmes dismissed the suggestion that hardship in requir-
ing the plaintiff to prove the law of Cuba had been overlooked, by stating
69 Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 123, 33 N.E.2d 51, 55 (1941); First Nat. Bank
v. Nat. Broadway Bank, 156 N.Y. 459, 472, 51 N.E. 398, 402, 42 L.R.A. 139, 147 (1898);
Cutler v. Wright, 22 N.Y. 472 (1860); Venner v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 160
App. Div. 127, 133, 145 N.Y. Supp. 725, 730 (3d Dep't 1914), aff'd, 217 N.Y. 615, 111
N.E. 487 (1916).
70 Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N.Y. 488, 495, 173 N.E. 835 (1930); Matter
of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison M. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 303, 169 N.E. 386, 392 (1929);
International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N.Y. 188, 201, 99 N.E. 722, 727 (1912).
71 Russell v. Societe, 242 App. Div. 801 (1933); aff'd, 268 N.Y. 173, 197 N.E. 185
(1934); Savage v. O'Neil, 44 N.Y. 298 (1871); Matter of Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div.
181, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439 (3d Dep't 1931); SCELESINGER, CompARATiv LAW-CAsES AN
MATnRA.s 129, 134 (1950).
72 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
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that, "The only just ground for complaint would be if [the parties']
rights and liabilities, when enforced by our courts, should be measured
by a different rule from that under which the parties dealt." 78
The New York Court of Appeals took the same position in Riley v.
Pierce Oil Corporation,4 when it refused to permit recovery in a con-
version action-the property in question being located in Mexico--no
proof having been supplied of the law of Mexico. The court held that
whether the plaintiff possessed the requisite title or right to possession
depended on the law of Mexico, and that it could not pass upon the
question in the absence of proof of that law.
Another presumption sometimes employed is that rudimentary con-
tracts or torts-a promise to pay for goods or a battery, for example--
create a liability in any civilized country and that if an obligation of this
nature should initially be governed by foreign law, the court may
nevertheless enforce it in the absence of proof of that law by applying
universal rules or principles of justice presumed to be recognized by the
courts of all nations: 75 for example, that contracts are enforceable or
that there may be a recovery for intentional injuries to person or prop-
erty. This presumption is equally applicable whether the foreign juris-
diction has a common law or civil law jurisprudence, but it often becomes
a question of some difficulty to determine what is elementary enough to
be deemed universally recognized. In Cuba Railroad v. Crosby, for ex-
ample, the court held that there could be no presumption that the de-
tailed rules of master and servant were fundamental to the juris-
prudence of all civilized countries.
As another means of curing the omission of the parties to prove the
laws of another forum, some courts, without the application of presump-
tions, have simply administered the law of their own jurisdictions, with
the explanation that, in the absence of proof, that is the only law before
the court.76 A variant of this theory is that adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Leary v. Gledhil-77 -that the failure of the parties to
prove foreign law raises a presumption that they have acquiesced in
the application of the law of the forum.78
73 Id. at 480.
74 245 N.Y. 152, 156 N.E. 647 (1927).
75 Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (1911); Arams v. Arams,
182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
76 Bayer v. Lovelace, 204 Mass. 327, 90 N.E. 538 (1910).
77 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951).
78 Citing 67 L.R.A. 33, 34 L.RA. (N.s.) 261, and Sturm v. Sturm, 111 N.J. Eq.
579, 587, 163 At. 5, 8-9 (1932). The presumption is also espoused by Professor Nussbaum
in 50 YALE L.J. at 1040 (1941).
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The Leary case involved an action to recover an alleged loan made
by plaintiff to defendant in France. In accordance with the pre-trial
procedures now in effect in New Jersey, the issue as stated in an amended
pre-trial order was limited to whether the money given by the plaintiff
to defendant was a loan or an investment in a business venture. At the
end of the plaintiff's case and at the end of the entire case, defendant
moved for a dismissal because there had been no pleading or proof
of the law of France, where the transaction occurred.
The trial court denied both motions, not on the theory of judicial
notice since the New Jersey Statute contains no authorization for judicial
notice of the laws of foreign countries,7 but rather on the presumption
that the law involving loans is the same in France as in other civilized
countries, and also because no issue with respect to the law of France
had been set forth in the pre-trial order. Judgment was entered for
the plaintiff.
In affirming the judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court, while
recognizing the dictum of Mr. Justice Holmes in Cuba R.R. v. Crosby"0
that a presumption may exist that all civilized countries recognize
that obligations and liabilities may arise under certain basic and funda-
mental transactions and acts, preferred to substitute the theory of ac-
quiescence for a presumption. The presumption that the law of the
foreign jurisdiction like all civilized countries recognizes fundamental
principles had, the court observed, decided limitations:
... in many cases it would be difficult to determine whether or not the
question presented was of such a fundamental nature as reasonably to
warrant the assumption that it would be similarly treated by the laws
of all civilized countries.81
The presumption of acquiescence in the law of the forum, on the other
hand, Chief Justice Vanderbilt wrote, does not involve such difficulties
since it can be applied without regard to the nature of the transaction.
The Leary decision, however, is colored somewhat by the special
facts of the case, and the court recognized that cases might arise in
which it would be unreasonable for a court to indulge in any presumption
as an alternative to requiring proof of the applicable foreign law. 2
Especially significant is the fact that the pre-trial order foreclosed the
defendant from raising issues of French law. In deciding that the parties
79 NJ. STAT. ANx. § 2.98-28 (1951).
80 222 U.S. 473 (1912); see also Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.
1931).
81 8 N.J. at 269, 84 A.2d at 730.
82 8 N.J. at 269, 84 A.2d at 730.
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could fairly be presumed to have acquiesced in the application of the
law of New Jersey the opinion states:
The defendant is in no way prejudiced by the application of the law
of this State. If he had desired to raise an issue as to the foreign law,
he might have done so in his answer or at the pre-trial conference or,
with permission of the court, at the trial itself, and himself have intro-
duced proof as to the law of France.83
In summary, then, it would appear that in most instances and where
exceptional circumstances do not prevail, a party relying upon foreign
law should be prepared by his pleadings and his proof to establish the
foreign law upon which he relies at the trial. The court in the first
instance, may refuse, in the sound exercise of its discretion, to take
judicial notice of foreign law. In such a case, the rules that developed
when proof of the law in all cases was required will apply: the party
having the affirmative of the issues on the merits will be required to
introduce his proof of the foreign law and to sustain his burden of
proving it or be defeated, unless he can be aided by any of the pre-
sumptions discussed above. In view of the fact that the presump-
tions available to the court may afford only temporary relief from
proving the foreign law, and may, even if they are successful, result in an
objectively incorrect result because of the substitution of the law of the
forum, it would appear that the safest approach is to be ready with
proof.
II. THE PROOF OF FoREiGN LAW
Formal Proof as the Safest Approack in Practice
Section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act "obviously . . . is permissive,
not mandatory," as the Court of Appeals stated in Pfleuger v. Pfleuger;8 4
hence, a trial court may request more or less formal proof of the law in
question. It would seem, as the foregoing discussion shows, that the
practitioner should be prepared from the beginning to prove as much of
the case as possible by the statutory and common law methods. A trial
judge cannot be expected to state that he is satisfied with the proof to
be offered until the completion of the proof; by that time it may be
too late for counsel to attempt to secure additional evidence.
Wherever possible, statutes, decrees or decisions of another state or
country should be shown by publications or books purporting or proved
to have been published by the authority of those jurisdictions, or proved
to be commonly admitted as evidence of the existing law in their judicial
83 Id. at 270, 84 A.2d at 730. The case is criticized in Note, 37 CoNra.r. L.Q. 748 (1952).
84 304 N.Y. 148, 152, 106 N.E.2d 495, 496 (1952).
Vol. 3 8
PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
tribunals.8 5 Copies of foreign court records, proceedings and documents,
should be certified and authenticated in the manner prescribed by statute.86
Documents in foreign languages should be translated and the sworn
translation should be offered in evidence, together with the original foreign
document from which it was taken. Since disputes may arise concerning
the accuracy of the translation in general or concerning particular
passages, it is advisable to have available or in attendance at the trial
the translator, or some other person versed in the foreign language, to
serve as a witness in support of the translation offered in evidence.
In most civil law countries, judicial precedents do not have the same
controlling force that they have in our country, and the courts of those
civil law countries are guided by the statute itself and commentaries
on it written by the leading legal writers.8 7 These commentaries are, there-
fore, an important method of proving the law of civil law countries and
should be offered in evidence, with translations, in the same fashion as
statutes and decisions. While the intrinsic force of the argument or views
of the writer of the commentary will appear from the writing itself, the
prestige of the author will not, and it is advisable in such cases to prove
the reputation and standing of the author.
All of the foregoing discussion is, of course, as pertinent to motion
practice (where proof of foreign law is required) as it is to a trial itself.
For the main part, however, courts are reluctant to decide issues of foreign
law on a motion. They usually hold that the effect of foreign laws must
be established.on a trial.88
The Use of Official Declarations
In most continental countries, the departments dealing with the ad-
ministration of justice, and similar governmental agencies, enjoy a position
85 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 391. The proof of the foreign document itself under the
Civil Practice Act is discussed in Butler, Proving Foreign Documents in New York, 18
FoRD. L. REv. 49 (1949).
86 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 395-398.
87 SCHLESINGER, ComiARATIVE LAW-CASES AND MATESLs 23 (1950).
88 Werfel v. Zivnostenska Banka, 287 N.Y. 91, 38 N.E. 382 (1941), is frequently
cited for the proposition that foreign law is a question of fact. See also Zitreen v.
Zitreen, 128 N.Y.LJ. 184, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 1952; citing Valentine v. Valentine,
109 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 280 App.
Div. 795, 112 N.Y.S.2d 884 (2d Dep't 1952). In Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 128
N.Y.LJ. 1574, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 1952), the matters raised on motion were re-
ferred to a referee to determine the "applicable law of the foreign state." On the other.
hand, motions for summary judgment involving foreign law were decided in Albert
v. McGrath, 104 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Credito Italiano v. Rosenbaum, 246 App.
Div. 687 (1st Dep't 1935); Goldman v. Mulligan, 128 N.Y.LJ. 866, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Oct
20, 1952).
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considerably different from our own administrative bodies that are
entrusted with the enforcement of the law. These continental agencies
frequently are called upon to pass judgment, ex parte, on legal prob-
lems and to issue opinions in support of their determinations. It is
quite common, therefore, for a litigant in an American court to procure
so-called official declarations or certificates from a foreign country
on the basis of facts submitted by him.
It might at first blush appear that the use of these certificates
would be an admirable means of proving foreign law: it is com-
paratively inexpensive, and the declarations are issued by the very
country whose laws are in question. Closer scrutiny of the problem,
however, indicates considerations that compel reluctance in the accept-
ance of such "official" declarations or certificates.
In the first place, not all the facts may have been placed at the
disposal of the author of the certificate; nor is he available for
questioning by the court or the parties concerning what facts motivated
his conclusions. Furthermore, the qualifications of the writer, his
studies, prestige, and sources-factors that are the very touchstone
of expert testimony-are not before the court. Also, since these
declarations are usually issued in a foreign language, disputes on
translations cannot be settled by questioning the author about what
he really means to say.
A further reason for questioning "official" declarations arises from
the fact that their inspiration may not be impartial. With the growth
of nationalization 9 and the increased appearance in our courts of
nationalized entities as litigants, there are increasing instances where
the source of the official certificate is hardly distinguishable from
the litigant who supplies the certificate. As has been stated:
Interpretation of foreign law by officials of the foreign country has been
permitted, but what seems objectionable is to give decisive value to the
interpretation of expropriation decrees by the expropriating governments
themselves. .... 0
The notable instance in which official declarations have been admitted
and used as the basis for the decision of the court is, of course, United
States v. Pink.' In that case the Supreme Court of the United States
relied upon a certificate of a Commissar of the Soviet Union-which
89 An interesting commentary upon the increase in nationalization and its effect is
contained in 1 INx'TL A CoMp. L.Q. 14 (1952).
90 Domke, Some Aspects of the Protection of American Property Interests Abroad, 4
N.Y. CITe BAR Ass'N RECORD 268, 271 (1949).
91 315 U.S. 203 (1941).
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was not part of the record before the trial court-in its quest for
proof of Soviet law. 2  The case itself was argued on December
15, 1941, four days after we entered World War II as an ally of the
Soviet Government. It is doubtful that the case would be decided
in the same way if it were presented for determination today, nor is
there sufficient ground for claim that precedent favors the adoption of
such a practice.
9 3
While no arbitrary rule should be laid down, since the interests
of justice and unusual cases may indicate otherwise, it would neverthe-
less seem that proof of foreign law, by official declarations or cer-
tificates, should not be encouraged by the courts.
The Expert Witness and His Qualifications
In spite of the existence of foreign statutes, judgments, treatises
and commentaries, or even of "official" declarations or certificates, ir-
reconcilable conflict will frequently arise in bitterly contested pro-
ceedings. Such instances call for the opinions of experts in the foreign
law involved. It would otherwise seem to be placing too much burden
upon the court to expect it to determine the foreign law without other
92 Cf. Egyes v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 165 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1948).
93 Nussbaum, supra note 7 at 1030: "But the civil law system of admitting statements
by foreign governmental agencies does not seem to have been adopted in English or American
courts."
A very able and brilliant comparative study of the proof of foreign law was written
in 1908 by Dr. Ervin Doroghi, former Barrister-at-Law, Budapest, and former Professor
of Law at the University of Budapest, and was presented at the 25th Conference of the
International Law Association, held in Budapest. In general, this report also urges
the adoption of a uniform procedure for ascertaining foreign law by the use of foreign
governmental agencies. The report suggested that one court in each state be entrusted
with the duty of delivering opinions upon the request of courts in foreign states or, in
the alternative, the institution of separate commissions attached to the office of the
Minister of justice of the several states, with qualifications at least as high as those de-
manded by the state in question of its judges, which commissions were also to be charged
with the duty of delivering opinions upon request, as mentioned. Doroghi, The Authentica-
tion of Foreign Law ins Court Procedure in INT'L LAW Ass'N 25TH Rx. 221 (1909). The
inherent danger in having courts place full reliance upon certificates as to foreign law
issued by foreign governmental agencies is touched upon to some extent in the criticism
of the delegate Professor Baumgarten who stated:
I am of the opinion that the issuing of certificates about law in general is a very
dangerous procedure, and we should confine ourselves to issuing certificates as to acts
or rules of law.
Id. at 259. The unsatisfactory quality of proof, which does not permit cross-examination,
would justify the refusal of our courts to accept such certificates even as to "acts or rules
of law," and would indicate that proof of such acts or rules would best be obtained
through the testimony of an expert witness who can present himself for cross-examination
and questioning by the court.
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assistance when such situations arise. This need for expert testimony
was indicated in the dissenting opinion in Credito Italiano v. Rosen-
baum:
We have then the irreconcilable opinions of two authorities on Italian
law on a question on which the Italian courts appear to be divided.
Under these circumstances, the question ought not to be decided by
affidavit but by trial. It may be that on a trial the defendant will
produce evidence by leaders of the Italian bar to the effect that such a
note is unenforceable in Italy. The determination may depend not only
on decisions by the Italian courts, which appear to be in hopeless contra-
diction, but upon the opinions of experts in Italian law whose standing
and sincerity cannot be determined on such a motion as this.94
As this excerpt suggests, the use of the expert witness may frequently
be essential; in all cases expert witnesses are desirable. All misunder-
standings concerning facts, differences in translations, paths of reason-
ing and foundations for conclusions can be explored by direct and
cross-examination in the presence of the parties, the court and the
jury. The fullest compliance with every concept of fair play is possible
in such events.
The practical consideration of expense, of course, weighs upon the
decision to procure the expert witness, and in the past it was often
difficult to locate one who was resident or available in this country.
Recent world events have changed this situation considerably95 and
many former continental lawyers and students of foreign laws have
now made their home on our shores.
The courts have been perplexed on occasions by the difference be-
tween the English Rule,9" which requires an expert witness regardless
of the clarity of foreign statutes involved, and the statements in old
New York cases97 that where the statute is plain, witnesses are not
necessary. An illustration of the problem was presented by the recent
decision in Fusco v. Fusco,8 which involved the question of the validity
of a marriage, which in turn depended upon the effect of a Royal Decree
of Italy of November 17, 1938. A question arose whether the decree
must speak for itself, or whether the court could accept the testimony
94 246 App. Div. 687, 690, 284 N.Y. Supp. 177, 181 (1st Dep't 1935).
95 In March 1950, a report was submitted to the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, urging preparation of a list of lawyers in New York City, qualified to
advise or testify concerning the laws of foreign countries. Although the usefulness of such
a list was recognized, the proposal was not adopted, possibly because of the restrictive
influence that such a list might have. N.Y. C= BAR Ass'x RE. 1950, p. 252.
96 Sussex Peerage, 11 CI. & Fin. 85, 115, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1046 (1844).
97 See, e.g., note 23 supra.
98 200 Misc. 1039, 107 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1951).
Vol. 38
PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
of an Italian barrister regarding the construction to be given to it.
The court, in admitting the testimony of the Italian barrister, stated:
Defendant sought to question the applicability of this royal decree and
sought to elicit from a witness, who had been admitted to and practiced
as a barrister in the Kingdom of Italy, his interpretation as to the mean-
ing and import of this Italian statute. This court received the evidence
subject to a reservation to later strike it out. Wigmore (Vol. 7, 3d ed.,
§ 1953) discusses the question. The English rule is liberal in this respect
(Baron de Bode's Case, 8 Q.B. [A. & E.N.S.] 208, 265; Sussex Peerage
Case, 11 Cl. & F. 115). What few American cases can be found are not in
accord. In a somewhat recent New Jersey case (Max v. Max, 123
NJ.,. 580, 589 [10 A.2d 163, 167] [1940]) the court received the
testimony of a New York attorney relative to his opinion as to the
meaning of a statute of the State of New York. The logical conclusion
would be, it seems to me, that a court could properly admit a witness
to construe a foreign statute, provided the witness is properly qualified,
to aid the court to the extent the court saw fit to accept such interpreta-
tion. In the instant case this court, therefore, denies plaintiff's motion
to strike out the evidence, with an exception noted.99
The fact that in many of the cases the witness was a barrister duly
admitted to practice in the courts of the foreign country involved might
serve to confuse situations arising in the future, where explanations of
foreign statutes are sought to be elicited from witnesses who are not
practicing lawyers of the foreign jurisdiction. Any implications that the
testimony only of attorneys admitted to practice in the foreign juris-
diction is acceptable on the issue of the laws of that jurisdiction, would
be unfortunate. Such a narrow concept is not only inconsistent with
Section 344-a, but also with the common law.
An impression in accord with this narrow concept has arisen, how-
ever, as a result of hasty interpretation of the language used by Circuit
Judge Frank in Usatorre v. The Victoria.1°0
In that case-an action in admiralty for salvage with respect to a
derelict vessel flying the Argentine flag and owned by an Argentine
corporation-the court held that the issues should be determined by
Argentine law. The expert witness who testified with respect to the
Argentine law was an American lawyer, a member of the Bars of New
York, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, who had studied Argentine law and who
was the author of a digest of that law.
The court, in commenting upon the fact that the expert witness
cited no decisional law, but merely gave his interpretation of "uncited
commentators' interpretations of the Code" of Commerce of Argentine,
stated that:
99 Id. at 1041-42, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88.
100 172 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1949).
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The judge is not bound to accept the testimony of a witness concerning
the meaning of the laws of a foreign country, especially when, as here,
the witness had never practiced in that country.1 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Judge Frank was undoubtedly discussing only his reasons for not
accepting the testimony of the expert witness, a matter that was
entirely in his discretion, 1 2 and the opinion should not be construed
as touching upon the competency of the testimony. In any event,
whether a witness has ever practiced in the country of whose laws he
purports to be an expert, is hardly a conclusive consideration. The
testimony of the expert witness is merely opinion, and the true test
of its value has been stated by Judge Cardozo as follows: ". . opinion
has a significance proportioned to the sources that sustain it."'1 3 Meas-
ured by the above standard, the question of previous practice of the
expert may become quite irrelevant.
An examination of available English and New York cases on the
subject indicates persuasive precedent for the conclusion that expert
witnesses on foreign law need not be members of the Bar of the foreign
jurisdiction with respect to which the testimony is given, and indeed,
need not even be lawyers. Professor Wigmore1 4 accepts as the law
of England the rule laid down in the Sussex Peerage case, that foreign
law must be proved by calling an expert witness, and not by producing
merely the copy of the statute or legislative text,"5 and that besides
professional persons, individuals of any occupation that enabled
them to acquire special knowledge of legal topics may be "listened"
to upon those topics.10  Professor Cheshire'0 7 also states the English
rule that foreign law is -a matter of opinion and must, therefore, be
proved by an expert.
The practicing lawyer in the particular legal system is not exclusively
101 Id. at 438, 439.
102 See Matter of Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 185, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439, 445
(3d Dep't 1931), where the court stated: "The attempted interpretation of the statute by
the appellants' witnesses is not controlling. The statute being in evidence, its con-
struction was for the court." Bank of China v. Morse, 168 N.Y. 458, 61 N.E. 774
(1901). See also cases cited and discussed in O'Rourke v. Cunard S.S. Co., 169 App. Div.
943, 154 N.Y. Supp. 29 (2d Dep't 1915). Further discussion on this subject infra.
103 Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. Nat. City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 35, 170 N.E. 479, 483
(1930).
104 7 WiGo mOi, EvDmcE § 2090-a (2d ed. 1940).
105 Citing also 2 TAYLOR, Evmaoc- § 1525 (12th ed. 1931); see also Lozard Bros. & Co.
v. Midland Bank, [1933] A.C. 289; Beatty v. Beatty, [1924] 1 K.B. 807, 814; Nelson
v. Bridport, 8 Beav. 527, 50 Eng. Rep. 207 (1845).
106 2 WizoRE, EviDEcE § 564 (3d ed. 1940), also referring to precedent to the con-
trary; see also 3 id. § 690.
107 CHBSRE, PRIVAT INTEIxATIrOAL LAW 171 (3d ed. 1947).
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regarded as a competent witness in England, according to Cheshire,
and an individual is regarded as qualified to testify upon the law of
the particular foreign jurisdiction if the occupation, calling or position
of the witness indicates that he has acquired a practical working
knowledge of the foreign law.108
As early as 1611, in Anonymous case, the English court stated:
... if at the common law one matter comes in question upon a convey-
ance, or other instrument made beyond sea: according to the course of the
civil law, or other law of the nations where it was made; the Judges
ought to consult with the civilians or others which are expert in the same
law; and according to their information, give judgment, though that it be
made in such form, that the common law cannot make any construction
of it. 0 9 (Emphasis supplied).
In the case of the Sussex Peerage, which seems to have established the
method of proof of foreign law in England, a bishop of the Roman-
Catholic Church was permitted to give testimony concerning the matri-
monial law of Rome, on the ground that the performance of his official
duties required a knowledge of such law. Further examples of the same
rule have multiplied in the years since the foregoing cases.1 0  In other
words, the court may listen to any source of testimony indicating knowl-
edge or acquaintance with the foreign law, since the quality of the testi-
108 Ibid.
109 ("Admiral Court"), 2 Brownl. 16, 17, 123 Eng. Rep. 789 (1611).
110 In Vander Donckt v. Thellusson, 8 C.B. 812, 137 Eng. Rep. 727 (1849), the Belgian
law of promissory notes was proved through the testimony of a native of Belgium who
had formerly been a commissioner of stocks in Brussels (but at the time of his testimony
was a hotel-keeper in London), on the theory that his occupation in Belgium had enabled
him to become skilled in mercantile law.
In the case of The Goods of Dost Aly Khan, 6 P.D. 6 (1880), it was shown that
there were no professional lawyers in Persia, but that all diplomatic officials of Persia
were required to become versed in the law of that land, and upon that foundation, the
testimony of a secretary of the Persian Embassy was admitted with regard to the law of
Persia.
In Brailey v. Rhodesia Consolidated, Ltd., [1910] 2 Ch. 95, a Reader in Roman Dutch
Law to the Council of Legal Education, who had made a special study of the laws of
Rhodesia for the purposes of lectures, was permitted to testify as to Rhodesian law.
In Wilson v. Wilson, [1903] P. 157, an English barrister, who had researched the marriage
laws of Malta in connection with matters relating to his practice, was permitted to testify
as to such laws on the issue of the validity of a marriage solemnized on that island.
In The Goods of Whitelegg, [1899] P. 267, the testimony with respect to the laws of
Chile was obtained from an English solicitor who, while never a practicing lawyer in
Chile, had, as a result of his practice, acquired skill and experience in connection with
the laws of that country.
In the case of De Be~che v. South American Stores, [1935] A.C. 148, involving a bill
of exchange given in Chile, the court preferred the testimony of a London bank director
with many years of banking experience in South America, to that of a young lawyer
who had been a member of the Chilean Bar for only 4 years.
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mony will determine the issue, and not the qualifications of the witness.
Moreover, the court, which is solely responsible for determining the
question of foreign law, will take both factors into consideration.
The New York cases are substantially in accord and establish the
principle that a layman or a jurist of another country may testify
with respect to the laws to be proved, upon a showing of familiarity
with those laws."'
Decisions may be found in other jurisdictions that are .also in accord
with this proposition. In Connecticut i s and in the Federal Court of
Claims"' it has been held that study alone may qualify the witness to
testify upon the law with which he has familiarized himself, and an
Ohio court has stated that the fact that a witness is not well qualified
to give opinion evidence affects the weight and not the admissibility
of his evidence. 14 The California Code of Civil Procedure requires
merely that the witness be skilled in the foreign law.'"
The New York decision of Kirsten v. Chrystmos"6 sometimes cited
for the proposition that the opinion of a layman cannot be accepted
on questions of law, is not authoritative upon that issue. That case
involved a motion for summary judgment in which the opinion of
the layman with respect to New Jersey law was submitted in affidavit
form and stated only that he was advised with respect to the law in
question, without giving the source of his advice and not otherwise
showing knowledge of any kind with respect to the laws of New
Jersey.
11 Kenny v. Clarkson, 1 Johns. 385, 393, 3 Am. Dec. 336 (N.Y. 1806). See also
Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173, 177 (N.Y. 1829); Wottrich v. Freeman, 71 N.Y. 601, 602
(1877); Matter of Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 184-5, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439, 443-4
(3d Dep't 1931), citing American Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507 (1875); Vander
Donckt v. Thellusson, 8 C.B. 812, 137 Eng. Rep. 727 (1849); Lacon v. Higgins, 3 Stark.
178, 171 Eng. Rep. 813 (1822); and Hecla Power Co. v. Sigua Iron Co., 157 N.Y. 437,
52 N.E. 650 (1899). (In the latter case it does not appear from the opinion whether
the witness was an attorney and, in addition, the testimony was received without objection).
To the same effect see Reilly v. Steinhart, 161 App. Div. 242, 146 N.Y. Supp. 534 (1st
Dep't 1914), reversed on other grounds, 217 N.Y. 549, 112 N.E. 468 (1916); Johnston
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926). A more
recent example is indicated by In re Schneiders Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652
(Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1950), on reargument 100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1950), which involved
an application of Swiss law where testimony on behalf of the prevailing party was
given by an expert who had given much study to Swiss law, but who had never practiced
in any of the courts in that jurisdiction.
112 Barber v. Intl Co. of Mexico, 73 Conn. 587, 48 Atl. 758 (1901).
113 Dauphin v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 221 (1870).
114 Cincinnati Street Ry. v. Hickey, 29 Ohio App. 399, 163 N.E. 310 (1928).
11 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1902 (Deering 1949).
116 14 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1939).
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In the last analysis, the control of any proceeding and the witnesses
that testify therein is left to the discretion of the court, but it would
appear to be an abuse of that discretion under modern standards""
to reject any proffered witness on foreign law, save only in flagrant
instances demanding such course. The practitioner should not, of
course, abuse these privileges, nor should he be denied such rights
because his witness, a student of foreign law, is not a practicing
lawyer in the foreign jurisdiction. The weight to be attached to
the testimony, that is offered, is, after all, solely the responsibility
of the court, which, as the next subdivision indicates, may disregard
it in its entirety, if it so chooses.
The Court Determines Questions of Foreign Law
When the evidence is in the foreign law that has been proved as
fact assumes a new role and becomes law:
It is true that foreign law is ordinarily proved as a fact, still it is not in
its essential nature a fact any more than domestic law is a fact.118
By precedent and by statute, the court must ascertain and determine
this law and where a jury trial is involved, must charge the jury ac-
cordingly. The responsibility of determining the foreign law is placed
squarely upon the court by Subdivision B of Section 344-a of the
Civil Practice Act, which states that whether the law is judicially
noticed or formally proved,
:. . such law shall be determined by the court or referee and included in
its findings, or charged to the jury as the case may be.
This provision is actually a restatement of principles earlier enunciated
by the New York Court of Appeals on many occasions." 9 And the
statute provides further that in determining a question of foreign
117 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac? § 344-a(C) permits the court to "consider any testimony... on
the subject . . ." The suggestion has historical precedent, albeit with respect to witnesses
of another kind. Learned Hand in Historical and Practical Considerations Concerning
Expert Testimony, 15 HAgv. L. Rav. 40 (1901), quotes Lord Ellenborough in Beckwith v.
Sydebotham, 1 Camp. 116, 170 Eng. Rep. 897 (1807) as follows: "Their opinion might
not go for much; but still it was admissible evidence."
118 Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Iselin, 185 N.Y. 54, 58, 77 N.E. 877, 878 (1906).
119 Fitzpatrick v. Int'l Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1921); Hanna v. Lichtenhein,
225 N.Y. 579, 122 N.E. 625 (1919); Bank of China et al. v. Morse, 168 N.Y. 458, 77 NE.
877, 878 (1901).
English statutory law is to the same effect, as contained in the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act 1925, where it is provided as follows:
"Where it is necessary to ascertain the law of any other country which is applicable
to the facts of the case, any question as to the effect of the evidence given with respect
to that law shall, instead of being submitted to the jury, be decided by the judge alone."
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law, the court is clearly deciding a question of law. Thus the court's
determination without question is appealable.
A recent decision in the Appellate Division'2 ° is an interesting
application of the principle that the court is to determine questions
of foreign law. The issue involved was whether under Hungarian
law, the plaintiff could recover a lump sum equivalent to future periodic
pension installments allegedly due him. After hearing conflicting ex-
pert testimony on the subject, the trial court first submitted the question
to the jury as an issue of fact. The jury found that the foreign
law did not permit such a recovery, and that plaintiff was entitled
to only annual pension payments. This determination was then over-
ruled by the trial court upon the ground that under Subdivision B
of Section 344-a, the court rather than the jury should decide questions
of foreign law and the periodic payments were commuted to a lump
sum. The Appellate Division approved both actions of the trial court.
From the mass of evidence, which may consist of codes, statutes,
treaties, certificates, text-books, commentaries, monographs, treatises,
periodicals, dictionaries and written opinions,121 the American Judge
is faced with the task of stating the foreign law. The original language
of this testimony is usually. in so technical a form as to defy under-
standing even by an educated layman of the foreign country in question,
and the translations may be cumbersome and somewhat less than
comprehensible. 22 The court will indeed have been fortunate if it
had the benefit during the trial of oral testimony of an expert witness
to answer the many questions that may arise in the American judicial
mind concerning the meaning of foreign words, the background and
prestige of the authors of commentaries, analogies in comparative
law, the facts of cases cited as precedents and so many other frequent
and difficult questions.
The expert will, of course, offer his personal opinion to support
the side that has called him, and the court must evaluate the degree
that partisanship has played in the giving of the opinion.' Justice
120 Sulyok v. Penzintezeti Kozpont, Budapest, 279 App. Div. 528, 111 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1st Dep't 1952), modified on other grounds, 304 N.Y. 704, 107 N.E.2d 604 (1952).
121 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 344-a(C) states that where the foreign law is judicially
noticed, ". . . the court may consider any testimony, document, information or argument
on the subject. .. ."
122 Moses, International Legal Practice, 4 FoRD. L. REv. 244 et seq. (1935).
123 The subject of natural bias was interestingly commented upon by Learned Hand in
Historical and Practical Considerations Concerning Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV.
40, 53 (1901), where he stated:
Enough has been said elsewhere as to the natural bias of one called in such matters
to represent a single side and liberally paid to defend it. Human nature is too weak
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will not be shackled by the mere rendition of the opinion; the latter
must be sustained by sources and intrinsic merit:
* . . it is entirely proper to ask an expert witness to state what in his
opinion is the foreign law applicable to any given case. That is primarily
the purpose for which the expert is called. The weight to be given to
his opinion will, of course, depend upon the reasons he advances and
the authorities he cites to sustain his conclusions. 12 4
Precedent exists, as in the Usatorre case, for example, showing in-
stances where expert testimony has been disregarded. In Dougherty v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,2 the court arrived at a conclusion
wholly contrary to the opinions of the experts on both sides, approving
the statement of the Trial Referee:
Whatever witnesses called as experts may say, I must interpret the re-
sult of these decrees. 12 6
for that; I can only appeal to my learned brethren of the long robe to answer candidly
how often they look impartially at the law of a case they have become thoroughly
interested in, and what kind of experts they think they would make, as to foreign
law, in their own cases.
124 Reis v. N.Y. Trust Co., 136 Misc. 141, 143, 239 N.Y. Supp. 568, 571 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1929). In Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. Nat. City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 34, 170 N.E.
479, 483 (1930), the court stated:
This does not mean, however, that the mere opinion of a witness will control thejudgment of a judge except to the extent that it is a reasonable inference from statute
or from precedent or from the implications of a legal concept, such as contract or testa-
ment or juristic personality.
It is interesting to note that Sections 212-225 of the Civil Practice Act of the Canton
of Zurich, Switzerland, (Law Concerning Civil Proceedings), make provision for the
use of experts in matters requiring specialized knowledge, including law. Although these
experts are appointed by the judge, the parties make suggestions for their selection, and
in no way is a judge bound by the testimony of the experts. The files in the case may
be submitted to the experts in advance to prepare written opinions answering questions
put to them by the judge. These opinions can be expanded and clarified by further
opinions requested by the court or by oral examination, if the court feels it necessary.
The foregoing is analogous to our own "Model Expert Testimony Act" which was
recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
as a Uniform Act and which was redesignated a "Model Act" in 1943. The act is designed
to cover the need for expert testimony and to eliminate the evils of bias and partisan-
ship. Its provisions authorize the court to select and summon expert witnesses for
conferences, joint reports, or their personal examination on the subject matter. Another
of the purposes of the act is to remove the objectionable features of hypothetical questions.
Statutes which have similar effect have been enacted in California, Rhode Island and
Wisconsin. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1871 (Deering 1949); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 537, § 20
(1938); WIs. STAT. § 357.27 (1951).
12 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934).
126 Id. at 87, 193 N.E. at 902 (1934); accord, Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N.Y.,
280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939); Bank of China et. at. v. Morse, 168 N.Y. 458, 61
N.E. 774 (1901); Matter of Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439
(1931). See also the cases cited and discussed in the opinion in O'Rourke v. Cunard
Steamship Co., Ltd., 169 App. Div. 943, 154 N.Y. Supp. 29 (1915); A/S Tallinna
Laevauhisus v. Estonian State S.S. Line, LI. List L.R. 99, 108 (1947); Note, 49 YAxE
LJ. 324 (1940).
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Should the Court Rely on Its Own Research
In most jurisdictions, the evidence of the foreign law will be con-
fined to the actual record before the Court because of an absence of
authority to take judicial notice of foreign law. The judge is confined
to the material referred to by the expert, but he may examine the
law in question to see if the expert's interpretation is proper27
In respect to foreign countries, this is even true, as already indicated,'2
in the approximately twenty-five states that have adopted the Uniform
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act' because of the limitation of that
Act to states, territories, and other jurisdictions of the United States.:80
A question of considerable importance arises in such jurisdictions
as Massachusetts, where it is compulsory that the court take judicial
notice of foreign law of sister states and foreign countries, 3 ' and in
New York where, under Section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act, an
equal power is permissive. 3
For example, Subdivision C of the New York Statute states that
the court (trial or appellate) may consider sources "discovered through
its own research."- 3
It would seem questionable, both as to propriety and efficacy, for a
127 Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse,
[1923] 2 K.B. 630, 643. See the discussion in DiSora v. Philllpps, 10 H.L.C. 624, 636, 11
Eng. Rep. 1168, 1173 (1863).
128 See note 31 supra.
12 DEL. REv.. CODE § 4696, 4697 (1935); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.031 (Cum. Supp.
1952); HAw. REv. LAWS §§ 9931-9934 (1945); ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 51, §§ 48g--48n (Smith-
Hurd 1950); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-4801-2-4807 (Burns 1946); KAx. GmN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-2878--60-2880 (Cum. Supp. 1947); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 422.081--422.087 (1948);
ME. REV. STAT. c. 100, §§ 135-140 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 35, §§ 56-62 (Flack
1952); MamN. STAT. ANN. §§ 599.05-599.10 (West 1947); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 490.070-
490.120 (1949); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 93-501-1-93-501-8 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-12,101-25-12,107 (1948); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:82-27-2A:82-33 (1953); N.D.
REv. CODE §§ 31-1003-31-1005 (1943); Omo GEx. CODE §§ 12102-31-12102-37 (Cum.
Supp. 1952); ORE. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 2-503-2-509 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§§ 291-296 (Cum. Supp. 1952); R.I. Acts and Resolves 1940, c. 939; S.C. CODE ANx.
§§ 716-1-716-8 (Supp. 1948); S.D. CODE ANN. § 36.0702 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 9773.1-9773.7 (Williams Cum. Supp. 1952); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5.24.010-5.24.060
(1952); Wis. STAT. § 328.01 (1951); WyO. Coiu. STAT. AN. §§ 3-3109-3-3115 (1945).
130 Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act §§ 1, 5, 9 U.L.A. 401, 408 (1951).
Maryland has extended judicial notice to all common law jurisdictions outside as well as
within the United States. See SCH.ESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw-CAsEs AND MATEIAas 125
(1950).
131 MAss. GmN. LAws c. 233, § 70 (1932).
132 See 9 N.Y. JuDICiAL COuNcIL REP. 281 (1943) for rule in other states.
133 Where a matter of law specified in this section is judicially noticed, the court
may consider any testimony, document, information or argument on the subject, whether
the same is offered by counsel, a third party or discovered through its own research.
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court to rely upon its own research in matters dealing with the law
of foreign countries, except in special cases where the ends of justice
compel that action.
The doubt concerning the propriety of a court's private research was
very ably expressed by Mr. Justice Walter of the New York Supreme
Court in Arams v. Arams, where he stated:
... if cases now can be decided according to whatever law the judge sees
fit to apply and is able to discover by his own private researches, undis-
closed to the parties, then much that hitherto has been regarded as es-
sential to the right to pronounce judgment-the raising of an issue
determinable by reference to the law of a specified place, and an opportu-
nity to know what the deciding tribunal is considering and to be heard
with respect to both law and fact-would seem to have been abolished.
I am unwilling to assume that a power so contrary to the plainest principles
of fair-dealing and due process of law was intended or has been con-
ferred.134 (Emphasis supplied).
United States District Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., of the
District of Massachusetts, expressed the same sentiments when he
delivered the 1952 Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture in New York City,
entitled A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility and stated:
.. . when a judge has tended to reach his result partly on the basis of
general information and partly on the basis of his studies in a library
... it seems to me that the judge, before deriving any conclusions from
any such extra-judicial document or information, should lay it before the
parties for their criticism. 3 5
The Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute en-
visions similar restraints, even though it deals with judicial notice
of the common law and statutes -of every jurisdiction of the United
States.'36 Thus, Rule 804 provides:
(1) The judge shall inform the parties of the tenor of any matter to be
judicially noticed by him and afford each of them reasonable opportunity
to present to him information relevant to the propriety of taking suchjudicial notice or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed.
134 182 Misc. 328, 330, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943). The
court cited Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48 (1932); U.S. v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265
U.S. 274, 288, 289 (1924); I.C.C. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913);
Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 281 (1912); Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 US.
254, 264-66 (1891); Cohen v. City Company, 283 N.Y. 112, 117, 27 N.E.2d 803,
805 (1940); Jackson v. Strong, 222 N.Y. 149, 154, 118 N.E. 512, 513 (1917); Lamphere
v. Lang, 213 N.Y. 585, 588, 108 N.E. 82, 83 (1915); Clapp v. McCabe, 84 Hun 379,
387-90, 32 N.Y. Supp. 425, 432-33 (2d Dep't 1895); aff'd, 155 N.Y. 525, 50 N.E. 274
(1898); followed in Berg v. Oriental Consolidated Mining Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
135 7 REcORD OF N.Y. Ci y BAR AssocAioN 280, 294, 295 (1952).
136 See SCH.ESInGER, CASES AND MATERIALS oN COmPARATIVE LAW 124 (1950).
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Aside from the conflict with fundamental concepts of fair play1 37
and the right to cross-examination, there are other reasons why courts
should not embark upon private research in the field of the law of
foreign countries, especially civil law countries.
In the first instance, there are few complete foreign law libraries
in this country,'" and indeed in some jurisdictions"" there are no
collections of the decisions of its courts to which reference may be
made, and the texts of its statutes can be found for the most part, in
this country, only in the Congressional Library, Washington, D. C.
Then, too, there is a drastic difference in concepts and practice
between the civil and the common law systems, and no uniformity
necessarily in the civil law systems of the non-Anglo-American coun-
tries."4 Moreover, the differences in language set a trap of the most
treacherous type. Words that sound alike in two different languages may
have different meanings,14" ' and the same word may mean different
137 Schoch, Book Review, I Am. J. Coi. L. 295, 297, 298 (1952):
.. . [Tihe kind of evidence that American lawyers would regard as an equivalent
of testimony obtained through examination and cross-examination by counsel, a pro-
cedure which they will always consider "the most effective method of arriving at the
truth that man has devised".
Because I share this view, I find myself in disagreement with Professor Nussbaum
on the subject of proof of foreign law (pp. 38-39). He favors the Swiss system
which permits the judge to employ "any serviceable means of information" on foreign
law. There may be room for some measure of elasticity in our procedure, although
experience in New York has shown that the judges are well aware of the inherent
limitations of "judicial notice" of foreign law, which Section 344-a of the Civil Practice
Act authorizes. A Swiss judge may find no great difficulty in ascertaining a point of
French or German law by an investigation of his own. But he will not get very far
if he attempts to grope his way through American decisions, statutes, textbooks,
and other legal materials. The common law method of testimony of witnesses may
be "cumbersome" and "over-expensive" (which, incidentally, is a general criticism
civil lawyers voice against American procedure); but it does not deserve to be
graded "inadequate" in comparison with the haphazard ways by which civil law
courts ascertain foreign law. While it is, of course, true that proof of foreign law
cannot be treated exactly like proof of a fact, because it necessarily involves con-
clusions and opinions, yet I believe that oral testimony and cross-examination
furnish an invaluable test of an expert's opinion. It rarely happens that all that
is required in a case is the text of a statute or a code provision; as a rule, the ap-
plicability and interpretation of such texts and of court decisions applying them are
disputed. "Opinions of renowned experts" submitted in writing, which are customary
in Switzerland as in other civil law countries, seem a poor substitute for the viva-voce
probings of an expert on the witness stand.
13S Nussbaum, 50 YALE L.J. at 1023.
139 Liechtenstein.
140 Moses, 4 FolD. L. REv. 244 (1935).
141 In re Zietz' Estate, 201 Misc. 580, 105 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County
1951), aff'd without opinion, 280 App. Div. 919, 115 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st Dep't 1952).
Although not indicated in the opinion, the minutes of the trial show that a German
domicile was sought to be proved for the decedent by introduction into evidence of
a passport of the decedent which contained the phrase "domicileado actualmente en
Berlin." The opinion of an expert witness familiar with the language was introduced
to show that the correct translation of this phrase was "at the present time living in
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things in different countries, although the language employed is the
same.
142
The restraints upon independent research by the trial court apply
equally to the appellate court, and the few instances where appellate
courts have relied upon their own research in foreign law were attended
with compelling reasons in the interests of justice.
Thus in Matter of Peart,43 the Appellate Division explained its
action as follows:
We could remit the proceedings to the Surrogate's Court to take testimony
concerning the pertinent Virginia and Maryland law. In view of the small
size of the estate, however, . . . we feel that in the interests of justice we
should decide the new question raised on the basis of the cases submitted
by counsel on this appeal, aided by our own independent although neces-
sarily circumscribed research (Civ. Prac. Act, § 344-a; Graybar Elec. Co.
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 292 N.Y. 246).144
In view of the fact that the court's independent research related to
the law of a sister state (Virginia), and not to the law of a foreign
nation, the Peart case is doubtful authority for the proposition that
in the absence of a stipulation or the consent of counsel, the court
should independently determine for the first time on appeal questions
relating to laws of foreign nations, especially if they involve foreign
languages. This is indicated by the fact that the Court of Appeals
of New York in Sonnesen v. Panama Transpbrt Co.,' 45 where the issue of
foreign law was first raised on appeal, reversed the lower court which had
based its decision on the law of the forum, and ordered a new trial
to enable the foreign law to be proved. The opinion, in that respect,
reads as follows:
We are not entitled to assume that the maritime law of Panama (a "civil
law" country) is the same as ours, or as any part of ours (Ozanic v. United
States, 165 F.2d 738, 744). Furthermore, we do not think this an appro-
priate case in which, under section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act, to take
judicial notice of the foreign law. Since the trial was on an erroneous
theory, we, in the interests of justice, order a reversal and grant a new trial
as to the first alleged cause of action.' 46
Berlin." In other words, "domiciliado actualmente" means "temporary place of abode,"
not "actual domicile."
142 See note 140 supra. See also FLEscH, ART or CLEAR THINKING 35 et seq. (1951),
for an interesting discussion of the complexities in the translation and determining the
meaning of foreign words.
143 277 App. Div. 61, 97 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1st Dep't 1950).
144 Id. at 63, 97 N.Y.S.2d at 881. See also Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn. 152, 70
At. 453 (1908); Walker v. Lloyd, 295 Mass. 507, 510, 4 N.E.2d 306, 307-08 (1936);
Saloshin v. Haule, 85 N.H. 126, 155 Atl. 47 (1931); Tarbell v. Grand Trunk, 96 Vt.
170, 118 AUt. 484 (1922).
145 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949).
146 298 N.Y. at 267, 82 N.E.2d at 571.
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III. CONCLUSION
The history of law indicates an ever progressive removal of legal
restraints and limitations that might otherwise prevent the enforce-
ment of rights and liabilities measured by the laws under which the
parties dealt, even if those laws were enacted by foreign nations.
New statutory enactments, like Section 344-a of the New York
Civil Practice Act, have liberalized the law of evidence and tend to
dispense with certain formalities, formerly required by the law
of evidence, regarding the manner in which the laws of foreign states
or countries may be invoked and determined.
On the whole, while courts have acted with discretion and liberality
in dealing with foreign law to avoid miscarriage of justice, prior
rules respecting the pleading and proof of foreign law are still observed.
The task of ascertaining the foreign law, which is imposed upon
the court, is made complex because of language difficulties, differences
in theories and thought and lack of uniformity.
A way out of the dilemma would appear to be the use of an expert
witness skilled in the foreign law. The criticism, that the expert's
testimony may be broken down by skillful cross-examination, due to
lack of knowledge of the English language and technical legal terms,14
obscures the fact that since the court is in the last analysis responsible
for finding the foreign law, and not the jury,'" unfair use of cross-
examination will have little effect upon the experienced judge. Perhaps
the greatest assistance to the court is that the expert witness is present
to offer translations and answer questions of the trial judge and of
counsel.
This witness need not be a practicing attorney in the foreign juris-
diction, the laws of which are sought to be proved, but the weight to
be given to the opinions expressed should be left to the court and
should depend upon the qualifications and background of the expert,
the reasons advanced and authorities cited.
In all fairness to the litigants, their right of cross-examination and
their right to know what the deciding tribunal is considering, the court
should not do independent research on questions of foreign law,
nor should it accept "official" declarations or certificates concerning
foreign law. The authority to do so, accorded by Section 344-a and
other statutes, should be reserved for very unusual situations and
solely in the interests of substantial justice.
147 Hirschfeld, Proof of Foreign Law, 11 L.Q. Rxv. 241-42 (1895); 9 N.Y. JUDICAL
Couiecm REP. 283 (1943); Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43
F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930).
148 Section 344-a(C).
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